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' Introduction
With the introduction of democracy m South Africa, legal mechanisms of discrimination
based on race will be abolished; however, this paper seeks to explore historical examples of
discrimination which operated outside the legal structure and which relied on pervasive cultural
constructions of gender as well as race. The connection between racism and sexism in South
Africa has been viewed primarily through the overarching constrictions of apartheid, the system of
legal racial stratification which disenfranchised 80% of that country's population. Issues of sexual
oppression have been characterized as being layered or grafted on to racism, intensifying
oppression to a stage of "triple oppression" (race/sex/class) for African women. But few scholars
have been satisfied with thjsNjjaradigm and today, with legalized racism abolished, it is appropriate
to reexamine the historical connection between racial and gender discrimination, problems which
may not disappear despite the establishment of democratic rule in South Africa. It is the purpuse
of this paper to demonstrate that constructions of gender and race in South Africa are
interconnected and have been used to reinforce discrimination and stratification on both counts.
The paper will focus on the introduction during World "War n of both white women and
African males into jobs previously held by white males. At the beginning of the wr , it was
apparent thai Soudt Afhca laved a serious shortage of labor based on pre-existing regulations and
restrictions concerning employment. While most factory jobs were legally classified for white
males only, military service was also restricted to that group, prompting a shortage of workers in
d diug armaments factories inside the country. While the government lookd f kpg gp g y government looked for workers '
to operate the state-established factories, unions struggled to safeguard the interests of their white
male members by holding the line at both race and gender. As Iris Berger notes in her
comprehensive study of organized women workers, both race and gender were viewed by union
officials as comparable boundaries and the weakening of one could lead to challenges to the other.
Despite differences in the way individuals were viewed based on their race, women were
considered a subordinated group as were ">T on-Europeans." and their entry into the workforce
threatened the prevailing socialperception of "workers."
Differences in the constructions of gender, however, depicted women as home-bound and
thus logically temporary workers while males-black and white-were automatically considered a
permanent workforce. Based on these gender constructs, white women were viewed as less
threatening than black males and union officials were convinced to allow them into jobs
previously held by white males on the assumption that they wouM peacefully vacate the jobs at the
end of the war in favor of returning white males. Extending the Wgic of these gender constructs.
the jobs were transformed into "women's work" and the women were paid less than white males
since it was assumed that they were not their family's sole breadwinner. This process, which both
feminized and deskilled the jobs, usually amounted to dividing several skilled tasks former])'
performed by one white male employee between several females: the assumption was that women
could not perform such complicated work. According to the discourse which justified their
inclusion in the workforce, the jobs were thus made appropriate for a subordinated group and the
women, depicted as loyal wives and mothers serving their country, rendered non-threatening. In
reality, they were poor and desperate women struggling to support their families. When the war.
ended, they were summarily dismissed and in. some cases physically removed to their homes.
Service to their country had ended.
But the significance of dieir service soon became apparent. Their jobs, already devalued,
were filled not by returning white servicemen but by far less expensive black male workers. The
jobs had been re-classified through the South African government's restrictive labor bureaucracy
as "semi-skiued" making it legal to fill them with Africans, ,111c restructuring of the workforce
during the war had created new oppoituuilies fur Afiican workers eager for jots and for white
eoployers anxious to lower labor costs during the-postwar inflation. The "feminization" of factory
work during the war opened up the possibility of using a wide range of workers not previously
considered acceptable. All of mis was done despite comprehensive government control over die
economy during and after the war and a dominant ideology of while male privilege.
This paper will challenge previous analyses of the shift towards African factory labor
(Webster, Lewis) by focussing on the unofficial pervasive and hegemonic constructions of race
and gender which served to facilitate this shift. While gender discrimination hasnot been viewed
as an integral part of apartheid and its antecedents, there have clearly been connections between
iace and gender which have helped to form the fabric of South African society. The question
today is whether democracy, anymore than apartheid, can directly address the problems arising
from social constructions-race and sender-or whether such examples will continue to form
South Africa's future as well as its past.
Production in Wartime South Africa
* During World War II, the pace, structure, color and gender of South Afiican industrial
production changed profoundly. The dramatic jump in demand tor goods, including munitions,
consumer goods and previously imported machinery afl created massive pressures on government,
employers and workers to meet new challenges. And this pressure also opened opportunities for a
shift in the relations and balance of power between these groups. Nowhere were such
opportunities moTe sought after than in the engineering industry, suddenly at the forefront of
production of South Africa's most crucial war products, bombs' and ammunition. While national
security remained'paramount, the government, producers and employees all maneuvered to
preserve, extend or redefine power which co-jjd be carried into the postwar period.
At stake during the war was the very nature of production, already hotly contested in the
years before the war In particular, wbat methods would be used to transform the use of tools for
individual repair and limited production into standardized mechanical production, perhaps on a
massive scale? And who would form the expanded work force necessary for such production?
Most engineering firms were naturally eager to lower they- costs by employing workers at low
wages. Workersln the engineering industry suspected a diminution of power and wages. And the
government feared tlie temporary creation of a new work force which would demand continued
employment after the war. Above alL the ever dominant interests of the mining industry were
directly involved in this struggle as tie gold mines were both the major consumer of engineering
products as Well as the largest employer of skilled engineering artisans in the country. No solution
would be found which did not take into account the interests of the major revenue producer in the
country, the mines. V
The changing nature of the e4fceering industry duringtM war has been examined from
several perspectives. Both Lewis and Webster, in their cbmpretensrve analyses of long term
chanee tn the engineering industry, identify World War II as a pivotal period during which
ongoing changes in the very nature of production accelerated and were entrenched, leading to
redefinition of skiH. work and employees' power. The introduction of "macbinofacture," a<T
Webster calls it, and the "scientific management" of the production process (Lewis) led to
deskflljng, dilution and increased control by management over the production process. As
Webster states, "the war provided capital with the opportunity to go on the offensrve."i Lewis is
more circumspect, "It was the advent of the second world war which made possible the
transformation of the engineering industry and the traditional division of labour upon which it
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rested.'W la particular. African workers were increasingly brought into more responsible jobs as
employers successfully undermined the position of the skilled artisans. BotL aulliuis view sudi
change within 3 Marxist critique, as an instance of clear cut class struggle wiifle Lewis also
borrows from Braverman to explain shifting mechanisms of control. And yet in both cases, there
is link discussion of the actual transition to "inackinofacru/e," the conwclc iuliuducduu otnew
workers into new jobs: we are, however, presented with the accomplishment of such change and
the introduction of African workers into the industry.
From a different perspective, Iris Berger has touched upon a crucial example of the type of
change which occurred during the war. Berger is also interested in class analysis, and presents a
corapieliciiMYi; destiiuiiuu uf wuno'si struggles as pan of the South African working class.
Focussing on union activities while giving gender a central analytical role, Berger traces the shifts,
activities and successes of South African women. While most of her examples come from the
garment and food processing industries, where women have traditionally predominated, she
includes one chapter on "Women in Wartime Production" which, chronicles the activities of the
short-lived Women Engineering Workers' Union. 3 Indeed, the storv seems nearly out of place in
Berger's narrative as she concludes by saying, "Tnus, m accord with their designation as
'emergency workers.' the story of women employed in munitions factories occupies only a brief
chapter in tbe history of women's work in South Africa. "4 The short period of female employment
in the engineering industry appears almost irrelevant to the long term development of a female
working class. Yet their impact on the labor structure of the engineering industry was crucial. It
was female war workers who were first used to break down barriers not only of gender, but of
skill and ultimately race.
This paper will present the story of women war workers in the engineering industry in
order to argue that during this period gender was used by ail concerned as a mechanism to insure
control into the postwar period Union and government officials acceded to the use of women hj
the expanding engineering work force because both groups believed that women, due to
perceptions of gender, constituted a temporary work force which could be easily disposed of after
the war. Employers, on the other hand, and especially the mine's own workshops, welcomed the
women who could not only be paid less that) white males but who also offered ample concrete
proof that many engineering jobs required levels of skill and experience which were much lower
than was claimed by the unions. The use of the women and the re-definition of many jobs on the
basis of concepts of gender-that is, the simplification or "deskilling'1 of tasks-paved the way for
the eventual introduction of Africans into many of these jobs. While the women themselves were
well aware of the pressures surrounding their position, they were placed in a precarious situation
by all sides. The government categorized them as "temporary" at tbe outset of the war and while
the Unions fought for equal pay, they never fought for these workers' security. Employers would
eventually back away from workers who had undermined the labor hierarchy of skill but were
trapped in the union wage scale. Nevertheless, constructions of gender would prove useful in
redefining this work based on constructions of race. Thus the history of women workers can
neither be separated from that of industrialization nor of racial stratification in South Africa.
Assessing the Problem
Following South Africa's entry into the war. it took well over one year for government
planners, union officials and private businessmen to fully understand the scope of change required
of the country. South Africa's role in the war, the extent of military conflict and the continuing
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availability of iraports were yet to be determined. At snost, Prime Minister Smuts had agreed to
sijijjly lUc Allies with certain raw materials, especially coal and significant amounts of
ammunition. 5 Coal production could be stepped up thrpugh the increased use of unskilled and
easily obtained African labor. And production of ammunition was quickly organized under the
auspices of ihe government ,at facilities with the proper tools for such production, the South
African Mint and the workshops of the South African Railways (SAR). Yet as developments in
the European war intensified with the invasion of France, it became increasingly apparent that
South Africa was on its own in terms of many expected imports. By August JV4U, the
government was organising the production of everything from bombs to biscuits. Industrial 3s
well as military mobilization was at hand.
There wer^t^O major and interconnected problems the country faced in meeting
production demands; jack of either the appropriate machinery or the appropriately skilled worker
to produce such goods, ihe Defense Department bad quickly placed orders ibr the machinery
necessary to produce weapons and ammunition on a mass scale, but by spring 1940 it became
apparent that suchiorders could not be met from overseas. H e Director General of War Supplies
(L)GWS) stateg, "It was only after the invasion ol Holland and the rapid sequence of events that
. followed that jt b.ecame clear we must reckon on the possibilily of our being thrown on our own
resources for most of our supplies, "g And the country possessed impressive resources for such
production'including a steel plant, unlimited coal and electricity, "two of the world's largest single
units of explosive production," existing engineering shops and substantial secondary industries. 7
The government could also count on masses of unskilled labor. The problem was thatwithout
facilities for mass production, war materiale would have to be produced by highly skilled labor
using the only tools at hand which were somewhat specialized. In some cases, artisans were used
to design and produce more tools and simplified machinery; nevertheless, it became apparent that
machinery would not be available to substitute for a far more scarce, and politically sensitive
commodity, skilled labor. 3 .,
The government was forced to "farm out" munitions woTk to small workshops where
tools, not raachpes, were available resulting in the government's admission that "the use of skilled
labour bv such-methods is more extravagant that if special purpose plants had been designed and
built before production started."9 Lacking the necessary machinery to turn its vast resources into
the required military hems through mass production, the government would be forced to call upon
the extensive use of skilled labor.
South Africa's rigid structure of industrial labor organization, enforced both through legal
* statutes and labor agreements, and reflecting the historical development of racial and class"
stratification inside the country, would make such demands highly problematic. Initial industrial
organizations had stemmed.from the mining industry wbich.by 1? 11 under the Mines and Works
Act had been solidified into categories in .which race and skill were synonymous. Unskilled work
was designated for "Labourers," i.e., African* while "employees," or whites, wwe given more
rights and better pay. As further industries grew inside the country, this rough categorization
spread equating skilled work with white workers and unskilled with Africans Yet the wide array
of operations carried on in factories and workshops increasingly opened up contested positions
requiring some skills but not those of the full journeyman class which had dominated skilled
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positions. The journeymen were careful to preserve their position and in the 1927 Industrial
Agreement for the Iron and Steel Manufacturing and Engineering Industry, die Amalgamated
Engineering Union (AEU) recognized that several occupations "of a purely repetitive"nature
might be performed by employees other than journeymen at about 3/4 of the journeyman's rate of
P8) "lO Of course Mich "einpluye'cs" would lie white males. Tie AEU, the largest of the craft
unions, began to admit such workers while the Ironmoulders Society (MS) and the Mechanics
Union (MUJE) staunchly refused, j j During the 1930s, tbe issue became highly politicized by
AfilKauci ualkmalisls uyiug Lu vteuiy nu economic niche for their constituents in industrial South
Africa while employers were becoming increasingly interested in moving less expensive Africans
into such positions. Indeed, just before the outbreak of the war, three black unions claimed to
represent African steelworters and the government was considering recognizing one African
union m the inetak industry. 12 As Lewis and Webster both demonstrate, the established unions
were faced with the question of whether to define themselves by skill or race in order to protect
their prhileges.
The massive expansion of industrial employment prompted by the war thus threatened to
destroy the precarious position of white workers, especially since the greatest pressure fell on
those at the top of the hierarchy, the artisans. If their position was undermined, then justifications
based on skill would be hard to maintain for other white workers. Above all, the unions wanted to
maintain distinctions based on slol) which, were interpreted as synonymous with race. Most
discussions concerning labor during tbe war were framed by the unions solely in terms of skill.
ltiitiaUy, both unions and government planner's hoped that the existing ranks of the artisans
would be sufficient to meet the country's military requirements. In January-1940, tbe Department
of Labour reached agreement with the'Industrial Council concerning the emergency use of labor
cluring the war. Under the terms of the agreement, artisans would be moved from other industries
into munitions and war supplies and only in the absence of any available artisans would employers
be allowed to hire ''emergency workers." In what would prove to be unwarranted optimism, the
agreement sttte, "Applications for employment as emergency workers in the Industry' shall be
invited hi the first instance from unemployed artisans in other Industries.* Emergency workers
were 10 be'appointed by the Industrial Council, but there was surprisingly little direction given
considering that these workers would be required to perform some journeyman duties. i3~lt
appeared that the parties felt they might have little resort to such. l3bor based on their attention to
it. • ' • • " . . . • ' . ' . . ' .
But artisans were not freely available from "other Industries," especially not the gold
mines. As the DGS later noted, there had been a "noticeable" 'shortage of skilled artisans in South
Africa well before the war during the 1950s whea the gold mining industry undertook substantial
expansion h> newly discovered gold bearing areas. 14 The mines had managed to hold on to the
vast majority of their artisans during the war. employing approximately 4800 in 1944, as
compared with approximately 4600 fo; the entire engineering industry, j 5 Even when the demand
for artisans for ship repairs at the nation's ports was critical for Allied naval operations, the gold
mines artisans remained untouched, jg In June 1940. an estimate was prepared of tbe number of
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businesses which would be hurt by any reduction in the mining industry. 17 Indeed, government
plauueis. continually referred to fbe fact that the country's postwar industrial development
remained dependent on its largest consumer, the mines, jg Furthermore, the country's gold and
diamonds were crucial for purchases as well as weapons production. If artisans were needed for
war production, they would not be found in the mines' workshops.
Emergency Workers and Dilution
The subsequent and necessary introduction of "emergency workers" finally necessitated
serious thought, discussion and struggle over the terms and conditions of these workers'
employment. By May 1940. emergency workers had been hired at Iscor, the steel producer owned
and operated by the government. They were hired as moulders with the execution that the
artisan moulders already employed would train them. The moulders union, the IMS, had already
refused to agree to what it called "dilution," an interesting term, in wide use throughout the war
referring to the weakening of pre-existing labor ranks and used in the armed forces as well with
regard to the introduction of black and Coloured troops.] 9 They refused to train the emergency
workers at Iscor and objected that such workers were being used for more than military
production.20
Barring the training of such workers on the job, and probably to avoid any further refusals,
in July 1940 the government instituted its own training program, the Central Organisation of
Technical Training (COTT). This program was to provide shortened and intensified basic training
tor technical personnel to obviate the need for either extended apprenticeships or the awkward
and reluctant training on the job. More than 1400 trainees entered at that time. For a variety of
reasons, however, the scheme failed to provide any significant numbers to industry. Out of
approximately 26,000 trainees admitted to the program, only 306 were ever posted to industry.
Most--22,000--went into military1 service and crvflians were no longer accepted after July 1942.
More than 3,000 civilians had simply dropped out of the program. The program failed dismally in
its original purpose but left over 22,000 trainees with a government promise of postwar
employment, one of the inducements to join, which worried government planners for the
remainder of the war.21
By September 1940, both the government and the unions feared the worst. For their part,
government planners were concerned if they would ever find sufficient workers for the industry,
establishing a special labor committee for the engineering industry.22 The unions, on the other
hand, feared the creation of a large-scale and quickly framed skilled and semiskilled work force
which would undermine their positions and their wages in the long term. In order to meet both
positions-provide labor which would not threaten the long term interests of the unions-tie
industrial Council agreed that emergency workers could be used on Grade IT operations (referred
to as operatives rather than journeymen) and that women would be allowed in such positions.
While the unions stopped short of allowing "duution" of the journeymen positions, they did allow
it one step down, admitting that relatively little training was involved there. Even then, such an
admission was allowed largely with regard to a group automatically assumed to be "temporary',"
women, and which would not breach the racial barriers by stipulating that the women should be
white. Eventually 3211 women would become emergency workers as compared with only 827
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males.23 In addition, many more women would be hired outside government channels to enter the
vuuulry's LiuLuiiei.
Women War Workers
Employers, and especially the gold mines, proved eager to hire these women. The unions,
especially the AEU which represented the operatives who were most directly affected hy the
introduction of women, and the MUJE, quickly found that by November 1940 the mines were
making Ml use of female emergency labor. The problem for the unions was that the emergency
workers were being paid between 1/4 d. and 1/9 d. per hour, the agreed rate for emergency labor,
as compared to the" Grade II rate prevaffing in the mines' workshops, 2/ld. to 2/4-d, per ho'ur.24 ...
While the unions had agreed to the lower rate in terms of munitions production only, their fear
(later realized) was that such workers would also be used for the regular commercial work of the
mines. Indeed, the original agreement on emergency labor from January 1940 bad created a huge
loophole for producers by stipulating only that such" labor could be used "for the production of
munitions and war supplies or to enable the Industry to continue its normal or expanded services
to the country generally [author's jtalicsj."25 furthermore, the unions were obviously concerned
that lower wages for similar work would eventually undermine their own wage structure.
The gold mines responded to union requests immediately, but with a certain amount of
subterfuge. In December 1940, the Gold Producers Committee of the Chamber of Mines agreed
to pay emergency workers the rate requested by the unions, i.e., 2/1 d. to 2/4 d. per hour.
However, the mib.es were allowed to draw such workers "from any suitable source," and left their
recruitment largely in the hands of the Chamber. More importantly, nowhere in the agreement was
the gender of emergency workers mentioned. 2fi By February 1941, the AEU began tp complain
bitterly as female workers were moved into Grade II positions in the workshops at the lower
rate.27 The gold mines stuck to this position, finally forcing the unions to accept female
emergency labor at lower rates of pay in exchange only for the assurance that "such labour be
used Tor the duration of the war out)', and be not required to perform any normal mine work or
skilled work. "28 Again, the assumption would be made that white women constituted temporary
workers who would naturally return home at the end of the war.
The agreement was reached approximately one week after the government bad declared
the entire engineering industry controlled, with the notable exception of engineering shops in the
mines and the SAR. Under the terms of control, skilled workers could sot change employment
without the consent of the government; by October 1941 their wages were frozen and later in tie
war they were subject to transfer by the government on grounds of national secunty.29 Skilled
artisans were thus under government, not union, control as were the new entering emergency
workers who were employed as Grade II operatives. These measures severely undercujt-the power
of the unions. Furthermore, employers were alk»yed to hire workers who did not fall under any of
these controls, that is, to bring in females not designated as skilled or emergency workers and
certainly not represented by a union. And in another move to meet the need for.skilled workers, in
November 1941 the government required every employer in the controlled industry to employ one
additional apprentice for any employed apprentice who had completed three years training, while
this appeared to strengthen the hand of the unions, by adhering to the principle of apprenticeship,
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h also scriouslj- undermined standards of training: apprenticeships were cut from five to three
years with workers being employed as artisans at that uniK.30
In the meantime, women were being hired at government plants, mining workshops and
private engineering Snns throughout the country. Two thousand were already at work at (he
South Africa Mint in. Pretoria by October 1941. producing bombs and ammunition and working
on several machines including lathes. 3 j Five hundred women were similarly employed at Stewarts
and Lloyds, a private engineering firm, and thirty at Cofac, the government ordinance factory. j2
Interestingly, tbe one mine workshop visited by the Inspector of Female Labour at Geduldt Mines
in Springs, employed the women on bomb work but they "have gradually been trained to take
complete charge of the finishing machines and displace journeymen. "33 This repon confirmed the
worst fears of the unions.
By the end of 1941, the unions realized that they had a serious problem. They brought the
matter before the Industrial Council, especially with regard to the fact that there were "two
different pay rates for parallel lines of work" (munitions and normal production) and that "means
are now being sought to extend the scope of women workers to the Journeymen's occupation."
While the bouermakers and the moulders had admitted some male emergency workers, it was the
AEU. representing operatives, which was hit hardest. The union found female Grade II
operatives, paid at the lower mining rates (1/4 d. to 1/9 d.) being moved up to increasingry more
skilled work. The union was very clear in its objections:
"a cheaper class of labour will have been trained and demonstrated its
ability to discharge the work and will have the effect of (a) inducing the Industry to
' endeavor to retain this standard when profit control is! no more, or (b) compel the
Industry to demand this standard as a result of the Consumer's awareness of the
cheaper cost of production. For these and similar reasons in the matter of allowing
women to engage upon aspects of Journeymen's work, the Unions cannot agree
that work which otherwise would have to be performed at least at approximately
2/10 1/2 d. per hour, may be performed at 1/9 d. and at such figure above that
amount as an employer might estimate the production of the woman worker. Not
because of the immediate danger in established wage standards, but because of jjjg
danger inherent in traipinp a larpe number of persons to perfftrjm such work at a
lesser rate for Post-war purposes [author's itaEcsl."^4
The AEU wrote directly to Prime Minister Smuts, expressing concern that compromises over
wages and training standards might prejudice workers following the war.35 Despite all of the
government's assurances, however, the AEU had little success stemming the tide of women in
increasingly more responsible jobs at lower pay. Even at the government-run Central Ordnance
Factory (Cofac), the union found 38 women employed as "women operators" at rates of pay
varying from 1/4 d. to 2/3 d. pei hour, with the bulk between! 1/4 d. and 1/9 d-3§ The union
reiterated hs demand for "equal pay for equal work," Le.. 2/1 d. - 2/4 d. per hour.37 Even a
threatened ban on female emergency workers foiled to move the government, which by May 1942
issued regulations governing female workers which allowed them to be employed on general
production—not just munhions-and raised the wages only slightly to 1/5 d. to 1/10 d.. and 2/3 d.
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to 2/5 d. foi journeymen's work, as compared with, the male rate of 5/- ±3% Yet even those rates
were often eased at an employer's request.39
Thus the unions., and especially the AEU, had lost contTol over several classes of
employees: emergency workers were under the Controller of Industrial Manpower, workers at the
mines and SAR were exempted from control and the closed shop principle specifically excluded
female workers. Large numbers of women entering various engineering shops, and especially
those at the mines, were subject only to their employers' interpretation of their rights. Therefore,
in April 1942-as government appeals were failing--"the South African Trades and Labour Council
began a drive to try to gain control over these women by establishing the Women Engineering
Workers Union for female employees at any engineering, mining or ordinance factories inside
South Africa.
Female Unionization
Under the direction of the South African Trades and Labour Council (SA7LC) and in.
conjunction with the AEU. a union for women in the engineering industry was organized in 1942,
beginning with the government's munitions plant at the South African Mint in Pretoria.40 The
SATLC chose the Pretoria plant for the inauguration of the union perhaps because ir. emploved
more women tlian any other employer in the industry: over 1400 female "operators" worked at
the Pretoria Mint as compared with an addition 2700 scattered throughout workshops on the
Wirwatersiand, at least one-third of whom were "emergency workers" and thus exempt from
union membership. 41 With considerable assistance from the AEU, both in terms of interventions
with Mint management as well as office support, the union was established with 740 members by
the end of Mav.42 At that, time, a constitution was written and approved by the membership
which state the "objects" of the union, including "to consult with the South African Trades and
Labour Council on all matters affecting the interests of members of other engineering and allied
trade unions."43 Although established to represent women throughout the engineering industry,
the union never extended its membership beyond the women employed by the South African Mint,
including its branches at Pretoria, Johannesburg and Kimberley. and some women at Cofac.
Accounting for a majority of those women emploved in engineering, however, the union's
activities had a great impact on the place of women, and relative concepts of gender and race, in
the future of manufacturing.
Within months of its inception, the Union reached agreement with the South African Mint
over the terms of the women's employment. Their jobs were broken down into four categories,
with specific descriptions of duties winch could not be equated with journeymen's work: while
there were overseers and supervisors listed, some machines were adapted for single use
operations only, "deskilling" operations. Interestingly, all wages were exceedingly low, the highest
at 2/2 d. for a female overseer, while most including "General Operators," fell even below the
emergency workers wage of 1/4 d. to 1/9 d. In exchange, management held open the possibility of
"bonuses" or ''piecework" for the lowest paid groups as a way to increase the wage.44 Evidently
the AEU and SATLC, directly1 involved with the union, were willing to go along with lowered
wages and even the introduction of piecework in exchange for the clear delineation of skills
between these female workers and then1 own journeymen. They were most concerned to prevent
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an erosion in the value of stall., and as long as skills were disaggregated they felt no threat.
But the union organizer,, Frances .Engela. ran a running battle with Mint management for
the rest of the war, trying to force! compliance with even the minimal conditions of the agreement.
She fouuS that it sometimes took moutlis for an employee to receive ail earned raise or to be paid
for a promotion; that lathe operators were paid only 1/3 d. per hour; and that the promised
piecework and bonuses never materialized. 45 Indeed, although a commission of inquiry was
called by the Depanaiem uf Labour U> examine wwk tuudiUun^ ul die Miul, a seuuud, revised
labor agreement gave the workers even" less than before, retaining the same wage scale but
removing any mention of piecework because "the Treasury... considered that piece work was
lu public yulity null should be abolished."45
Widespread and pervasive m'sperceptions about the character of the female work force
were used 10 justify such unfair treatment. As the Industrial Council acknowledged in 1941,
women were Drought into munitions work as "workers who had qualified to fill their jobs for
whom employment would not exist" after the war. Neither the unions nor the government wanted
an additional group of workers who wanted employment after the war in an economy primarily
based on low paid, unskilled, disenfranchised labor. Women, .believed to be expendable in that
they could return home to be supported by a father or husband after the war. appeared to be most
convenient.47 There was never the slightest consideration by the government, and certainly not by
the unions, to allow these women to stay in jobs which might be claimed by white males after the
war, or for which there might be no need at all if peacetime manufacturing could not expand to an
extent to absorb these jobs.
Were such assumptions concerning these women justified? Certainly not. Despite the
enormous privileges afforded whites in South Africa, the white women who entered the war
industries were drawn from that segment of the white community1 which had, up to 1940,
beuefjned least from white political domination. When the recruitment of women began in earnest
in 1942, the bead of the Women's Section of the Controller 01 Industrial Manpower, Mrs.
Cameron-Swan, was told to recruit soldiers' wives first, then "deserving cases," that is, those in
dire financial need. As she reported in September, over 1800 women had applied, "most deserving
with children from 1 -11 in number unplaced. Five being a fair average number in a family."4s At
a closer look, possible in the case of the SA Mint where Fiances Engela collected statements from
the women, a common pattern in these women's lives emerges. Few had husbands in the military
and most were in fact tfie mam support of their families. For example, the statement of Mrs. C.J.
Muller personifies the common contradictions in these women's lives between expectations,
privilege and personal failure:
"I was married in 1911. My husband was a fanner at the time, but owing to
drought, etc. h was impossible to continue so we came to town and he joined the
army in the South West African campaign in 1914. On his return from German
West he went to German East Africa, he was eventually demobilized in 1918. For
months after his return from East Africa he was laid up in hospital with Blackwater
fever and afterwards rheumatic fever. It is definite that his health afterwards was
very pooT and it was with the utmost difficulty that we were able to eke out a
living. He obtained employment with the SAR as a labourer at a salary of L19 per
month, but die wages gradually deteriorated until he received no more than L13
per month. Meanwhile I had to rear our 9 children on this inglorious wage. I was
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compelled to do all my own work and could never afford a servant When lie
present war came my husband was employed as a labourer at Union Buildings and
as it was impossible to keep the bouse on his wages I found employment at the SA
Mint. "49
The stories repeated the same scenario, with the ironic expectations of the economic rights of
whites with the grinding realities of borderline poverty: "I am not living in'luxury on the contrary
our existence is a hand to mouth affair. "50 These women had little leverage agaiHst employers
who valued their race but not theix gender. Indeed, these women were vulnerable to vicious racist
arguments of the incipient Afrikaner trade unionists who warned them of "godlose kommunis"
and" 'n swart proletariat." Engela wrote to the Controller of Manpower,! "It is significant that
these men are endeavoring to capture my Union on racial lines, and, it is important to remember
that it is being manipulated by the anti-war element in one of the most important war factories in
South Africa, "JJ
In an interesting move, the union, which had changed its name to the South African Mmf
Employees Union in 1944. began in December of that year to represent African workers as well as
the white and coloured women in the plants. Engela employed an African organizer for the union
at Pretoria and solicited complaints from the.se workers. She uncovered e sorry aniatimr "The
Government...expects this starving worker to pay Poll Tax, support a wife1 and children, acquire
clothes, purchase tobacco and pay for entertainment on the scandalous wBge of L1.4 per week,"
The stories of these workers were far more unjust than those of the white women, but rang with
the same attitude by the employers: complete disregard for the employees and deep suspicion of
their motives and actions. Engela complained of several cases where injured African workers were
simply fired. 52 Accounting for 5-6,000 employees at the various Mint tranches, African workers
represented the vast majority and their organization would clearly add weight to any demands
made by the women. Further, they were the group most likely to replace the women in the
"deskilled" positions created during the war. Events would soon overtake tie union, however,
before such organization could take place.
In March 1945, just as the war was drswina to a close in Europe, the Pretoria Mint
loading field was hit by an accidental explosion which killed or injureo at least 250 workers and
effectively closed down production at the Mint. The remaining woikers at Pretoria were put on
half rime and eventually leg go. The coloured female workers at the Kitnberlcy branch ofthc
Mint, numbering over 1500, were let go and offered little hope by the government with the Prime
Minister's office complaining of "the pioblem of placing ex-domestic coloured servants who are
insistent thnt their future employment should be as favourable as with the Mint."j3 While Frances
Engela continued to try to get some compensation for her union's members for injuries in the
explosion, she could do little to find them new employment. With most members dismissed by
1946, the SA Mint Employee* Union was dissolved.
The AEU had attempted to control the influx of females into the engineering industry
through the establishment of the WTWU and, in tie ease of the Mint employees, had successfully
limited their entry to skilled jobs. The Mint employed the women in "deskifled" positions; that is,
repetitions of one aspen ofa multi-skilled journeyman's job and at exceedingly low wages which
even undercut the emergency workers. Machines and louls had bceu aujubleu fur jpTMter
repetition work, facilitating these operations. And due to the nature of the Mint—government
owned and otiftratrH anH nrnriiir.mo nrtlv rmimrirm*--thrr<» wac lhrl« thrpfit that the KtntAnvKT
would try lo continue such labor practices beyond the war. In this case, the labor unions
succeeded in protecting their positions.
Women La the Private Sector
But what of the numerous, scattered private workshops where war work and commercial
production intermingled and the temptation to use cheaper workers to generate profits and
undercut labor was the greatest? The WEWU had been completely unsuccessful in recruiting
women at the private workshops. The primary problem forme union was that the private
workshops were supposedly allowed to obtain female employees only through the government as
emergency workers and that such workers should be under the Controller of Industrial .
Manpower, and thus not subject to union organization. Although they were designated as
temporary and thus posed no proximate threat to the union, their duties and pay--ii uncontroiled-
could establish serious long term precedents for the Union. The bulk of women at the private
workshops were recruited in this manner, and control over them and their conditions of
employment was difficult to enforce with few of these women showing any interest in bringing to
the government's notice their employment in journeymen positions or at higher pay.
Throughout the war, women were employed in engineering workshops in a variety of
positions. Some worked in the government "annex" factories, private firms provided with
equipment necessary for war production by the government. By November 1944, the annex
factories employed over 159.6 "European females," 1396 "European" males and 4207 "Non-
Europeans."s4 These' firms included some of the largest engineering firms ro the country,
including Stewarts and Lloyds, Atoha Harris and Herbert Evans as well as the mines workshops at
Crown Mines and Witwatersrand Goldmining. And women were showing up in other private
workshops which had contracts for war work. Among those were several gold mines which
pushed to use the women on a variety of operations. In August 1942, Randfpntein Mines began to
use the women on core making—the preserve of the moudlers-for commercial use. The issue
came to the attention of the IMS who protested and the Controller of Manpower agreed that "if
the Management are successful in this during the war they vvfll fight very hard to retain the
employment, of women at reduced rates after the war as a right...I am of the opinion that
[management] and perhaps others also, have their eyes on the future. 55
Likewise, many employers rebuffed any government control, including the SAR which
refused to allow the Controller of Manpower representative into the workshop and the Chamber
of Mines which began informing mines in Augurt 1942 ttat they dud not need to obtain
government permission to hire female workers^ When the inspector was allowed in, h was only
to insure that certain requirements for rest room facilities. lunch breaks, etc. were being met The
inspector, Mri. Cameron-Swan, discovered women working in tool rooms on gauges and lathes,
welding, fitting and turning-all tasks normally reserved for journeymen-at emergency' workers
wages.57 She noted, "I am very disturbed at-the different wages being: paid for the same work.
Some mjnes begin 1/5 per hour on all work. Some firms pay 2 - and 2/?..JEor. same work,. Industrial
Council rates do not always agree with AEU."5g Even the Post Office resisted government
control and policies stating categorically that they were introducing women into certain types of
work with, the intention of keeping them there permanently: "The object of the introduction of
female lahrmr was ir» train voune women for eneineerine workshop duties which are more
. . . •
 ; . •. • 13
on machine tools now used for war production but later on for production of civil needs. "59 The
control of fenwfc Jabor by the government was flaunted by employers and employees alike as the
pressures to change the labor structure mounted. . " • • , - , .
As the war went on, certain, official concessions were made in addition to the countless
unofficial infractions of labor agreements and regulations. Tie major compromise was made by
the Iron Moulders when in 1942. the Controller of Manpower managed to get the Union to agree
to allow women to work on light core uaaking. The government argued tbat "tliifr type of WOJ'L is
largely automatic, and the woman would produce as much or perhaps more than the male." The
positions were classified as journeyman's and wages set at 2/- to 2/2 per hour.60 At the same
time, the AEU was frantically reporting the continuing diversion of femkle emergency workers to
regular mining operations, with little success.gi In fen. the inspector. AC. Payne, noted in a
report of women in the tool room at West Rano Engineering, It was of interest to hear that one
ofthe women workers was the best operator on the job."g2 Indeed, by January 1943 the
Controller of Industrial Manpower announced that women should be trained as fitters and turners
(journeymen) and that "It is not intended to utilise the services of these persons in work of a
repetitive nature similar to that of operatives but ft Is desired that they should perform the duties
usually assigned to journeymen."63 At that time, COTT instituted two specialcourses for women:
Fitters Course for Civilian Women (16 weeks) and Machine Tool Operators Course for Chilian
Women Personnel (20 weeks).g4 Indeed, by March 1944, the Controller's representative in Cape
Town actively promoted the use of women; "I am determined, despite the timorous attitude ofthe
Employers, to make use of women in the Engineering Shops... and have been forcing my
intentions on the shops who are consistently asking tor additional turners."$5
ID many cases, it appeared thai employers were moving rapidly to shift the women into
regular commercial work. Kandfbnteni Mines began using iemale emergency workers to produce
steel castings for its tube mill in July 1944 and Central Engineering moved females to commercial
work February 1945. «g The AEU tried to get some control over the situation by unsuccessfully
requesting that the Industrial Council take control over these workers away liom the Controller of
Industrial Manpower.^ The Controller held on, however, while some of his officials expressed
frustration over the mounting pressure to move the women into commercial work: "if we establish
a precedent in allowing one firm a contravention, where will it end?"$8
Postwar Planning
Indeed, the primary concern ofthe government from 1943 on was the impending chaos in
the labor market once the war, and employment in the military and in the war inoustries. came to
an end. The government's fear was that the 150.000 white soldiers wio were employed in the
military as well as an estimated 60,000 Chilians on domestic war work would all be thrown out of
jobs as soon as hostilities ccased.6O In early 1943. the DGS organized a Reconstruction
Corporation to "dispose of government factory assets" and workers and found the prospects for
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such workerj so worrisome that it proposed to keep them on "uneconOiilic" wuil lather itian &ce
tbc possibility of these workers on the dole.70 By 1944. the DGS was becotoing increasingly
concerned about the situation, believing that il would be economically unfeasible to continue
wartime production simply to provide jobs and that (lit uuuveraun of munitions plants to
peacetime production was merely wishful thinking. 71 As the Director of Technical Production
warned, private manufacturers should begin planning and ordering their plant from overseas rather
than xuakiug a "feiisli uf ike use of wai plants for peacetime production for which they are not
suitable."72 Nevertheless. Minister of Labour Madeley warned in September 1944 that in order to
provide adequate employment after the war, "a certain amount of [government] interference with
private enterprise" would be neeessary.73 The government feared an impending crisis which
would not be allayed by private enterprise.
Much of the government's fear had to do with the changed nature of industrial production
and the possible expectations of returning white males. During the war. the greatest increase in
employment took place in the engineering industry, with the increase in white female and African
male employment leading the way; however, these workers had not necessarily taken these jobs
from white males. Indeed, government planners canvassed all manufacturing and engineering
industries involved in war production regarding prewar and expected postwar employment and
discovered that an estimated 1U,WU white males had left these industries for military service out
of a total labor force of nearly 300,000. Engineering reported a loss of only 1711 white males to
the war, no doubt due to the heavy control over artisans. Most interesting, the firms estimated
increased employment after the war of at least 10,000 white males, primarily in the clothing and
textile industries^ In other words, the vast bulk of the returning soldiers had never been
employed in the industries which the government now feared would be inundated by them. And
any that had been displaced would be easily re-absorbed.
What the government feared was the continuation of an alarming trend: the "concentration
of industry, trade and finance in a few areas, with the usual congestion as an undesirable corollary,
while large areas of the country1 are becoming economic and cultural waste land." By 1936,43%
of the white population was in the major cities of South Africa, as compared with only 30% in
1904. Nevertheless, whites were outnumbered by Africans in these areas by 1936, 1.4 million to
.9 trillion. Several government advisory boards and commissions-Board of Trade and Industry,
Social and Economic Planning Council, Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission,
Rural Industries Commission»-all recommended broadening both the location and nature of
industry in order to avoid massive congestion and competition in the major urban areas as "If our
people are given the proper guidance in the development of their country with a view to the
raising of their standard of lring and, consequently, of their cultural attainments, there will be less
inclination in the wider and wider circles to concentrate on racial and sentimental politics.1^ The
government did not relish the prospect of increased enmity on the part of Afrikaners, fleeing
depressed economic conditions in the countryside and finding English owned businesses
employing Africans. Especially because jobs in the engineering industry were tied to the most
important industry in the country: mining. "In a final analysis the whole economic structure of the
Country still depends on Gold mining activity....Gold Mining, directly or indirectly, creates the
main basic demand for Engineering products and in formulating an Industrial policy we can only
do so on the assumption that for many years to come there wfffhe no diminution in Mining
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activity. 76 Replacing low cost workers--white women and African males—with unskilled, higbJV
paid and politically active white males threatened the future of the angmccring industry, the
profitability of mining and the stability of the government.
The government was particularly interested in utilizing Afiiean labor lo expand industry
and generate profits after the war. In the early years of the war, the IARC had privately come to
the conclusion that "Industrial expansion was crippled and we could never hope to become
economically prosperous unless the Non-Rwopeans were brought into more skilled work in.
industry and used more extensively. "77 Continuing discussions in government circles durina the
war repeated the argument that "The native is good material for all gradatipns of labour, from
unskilled to semi-skilled, and in time he may be. rendtred capable of filling. 10 some extent the
J auks of skilled labour.'^g Yet the question remained, in what capacity and at what cost?'
As the war drew to a close in 1944 and 1945. the government began to "interfere" in the
economy to avoid direct conflict over the allocation of jobs. The first group addressed was the
females who had flocked to wartime production, not from patriotism, but from necessity. At the
end of 1944. the government noted a "number of planeload girls who have no job to return to"
and "that it is desirable not to increase a certain inevitable drift of women to the town after the
war." The suggestion was made that they find employment in "many dorps" as waitresses,. ,'..
dressmakers and hairdressers. 79 The women were not eager to seek such employment, however!'
prompting the government to attempt to get rid of them by giving them a one-way rail pass when
they were dismissed go This was especially appropriate at some of the largest plants with: female
labor, such as Stewarts and Lloyds and the Matt wicrc women had been recruited from rural
areas and boused in hostels near the factories. The women still resisted, prompting a suggestion
by one government official to offer them a bonus payment, redeemable onryin then* "home
district. "$]
In addition to the war workers, the government was getting ready to release females from
the military who were also eager to enter the ©Kalian job nja*k«i. While the government kept the
soldiers toassist in demobilization, the war workers were released beginning April 1945.
Complaints were made by the military which claimed that clerical positions were being taken up
by the civiHfuis to the detriment of the enlisted females, g? In judging the postwar employment of
white females, Berger agrees that most went into clerical work after the war, and indeed
government figures show a marked increased in white female clerical workers and stagnant figures
in industry after the war.g3 It is also true, howevw, dial many of these women returned to rural
poverty and there is evidence that some worked as agricultural laborers on the estates surrounding
the industrial center of Vereeniging.g4
The largest growth in postwar engineering and manufacturing jobs took place under
government control and brought about the largescale introduction of African males into the
"deskilled" and fluid positions opened uj> during die war. Iscor. the governm|ent owned and
operated steel plant, extended hs operations, creating a towu--Vanderbijlpark--for a new plant as
well as several subsidiaries. One 01 the new companies, Vecor, offered government planners hope
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:hat more jobs would be created for the engineering mduscry.gs Indeed, the government intended
:o hire at least 500 machinists, 800 fitters and perhaps 600 taore operatives for Vcuor. In
particular, the new plant called for "single machine men," working an hourly wage and piecework
ft f h f l i r i h i i i l l l l d f•>ivt more of en for the female engineering workers. 8g Although initial plans called for COTT
raining, such plans fell through and the workers, some \vhiie"and many black, were trained on the
ob.
In addition to Vecor, the government also established manufacturing factories in the
'border areas" for the exclusive use of African labor. Beginning in 1943, the IDC began plans to
Wtablisb cotton textile and woolen factories in rural areas. Tlie express purpose was to use
African labor, despite all of the concern over unemployment of rural whites. The cotton factory injarticular was placed adjacent to a Native Reserve and the Native Affairs Department built a
Model "settleixient" for African workers. The IDC intended to pay these workers wages far lower
han those in the urban craters and. more importantly, to introduce African males into operative
positions in this relatively remote area. 37
Conclusion
With white women oul of (he picture, it is easy to see me shift from the prewar laboT
Structure to the shifting categories of postwar industrialization as a logical phenomenon.
However, this transition was aided less by the actual changes in technology which were not as
leiemiiuaui as it luay seem, but by the ongoing pressures of war and negotiations over power
which took place in union and government offices as well as on the factor)' floor. Gender
provided an easy transition category as the female workers were assumed to be temporary and
relatively disposable, less "able" than white males to do the job and non-threatening in terms of
my precedents that could be set. They fit perfectly into the unions' insistence on skill, not race, as
the primary focus of labor organization However, the deskilling and devaluing of these tasks set a
precedent which could be and was later applied in terras of race.
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